The
Bush Adminstration Know about planes as weapons
911 Commission
Alternative download
location: http://indybay.org/uploads/911planesasweapons.rm
President Bush's national
security adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and others have maintained, for example,
that the intelligence reports collected before the attacks were vague and
pointed to possible terrorist strikes abroad and not to the use of planes
as weapons. "I don't think anybody could have predicted," Rice
said in May, "that they would try to use an airplane as a missile."
But here is a video and Transcript of the 911 Commission showing she lied.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
Well, let’s start
for example with September 12th, 1994. A Cessna 150L crashed into the south
lawn of the White House barely missing the building and killing the pilot.
Similarly, in December of 1994, an Algerian armed Islamic group in Paris
hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into
the Eiffel Tower. In October of 1996, the Intelligence community obtained
information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel
and crash it into Tel Aviv. In August of 1998, the Intelligence community
obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an
explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center.
The information was passed on to the FBI and the FAA. In September of 1998,
the Intelligence community obtained information that Osama bin Laden’s
next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives
into a U.S. airport and detonating it. In August 2001, the Intelligence
Community obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S.
Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. In addition,
in the Atlanta Olympics, the United States government and the Dept. of Justice
and my colleague Jamie Gorelick were involved in planning against possible
terrorist attacks at the Olympics, which included the potential of an aircraft
flying into the stadium. In July 2001, the G8 Summit in Genoa, attended
by our President - among the measures that were taken, were positioning
surface-to-air missiles, ringing Genoa, closing the Genoa airport and restricting
all airspace over Genoa. Was not this information, Sir, available to NORAD
as of September 11th, 2001?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
It’s obvious, by your categorization that those events all took place
and that NORAD had that information. I would only add, Sir, that the intelligence
data that we postured our forces for and the training, and the tactics,
and the procedures that we used to prepare our missions for support of the
Combatant Commander of NORAD, had hijacking as a primary intercept tactic.
And we have some of the finest fighter pilots as you know in the world who
are some of the best people in the world, who can do their mission extremely
well. But we had not postured, prior to September 11th, 2001, for the scenario
that took place that day.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
Well, obviously, it would be hard to imagine posturing for the exact scenario
but isn’t it a fact, Sir, that prior to September 11th, 2001, NORAD
had already in the works, plans to simulate in an exercise, a simultaneous
hijacking of two planes in the United States.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Col. Scott, do you have any data on that? I’m not aware of that, Sir.
I was not present at the time.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
That was operation Amalgam Virgo.
Col. Alan Scott
Yes, Sir. Specifically, operation Amalgam Virgo, which I was involved in
before I retired, was a scenario using a Third-World United, not United,
uninhabited aerial vehicle launched off a rogue freighter in the Gulf of
Mexico. General Arnold can back me up, at the time, one of our greatest
concerns was the proliferation of cruise missile technology and the ability
for terrorists groups to get that technology and get it close enough to
our shores to launch it. In fact, this exercise, in this exercise we used
actual drone, MQM 107 drones, which are about the size of a cruise missile
to exercise our fighters and our radars in a Gulf of Mexico scenario.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
You are referring to Amalgam ’01, are you not?
Col. Alan Scott
Yes, Sir.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
I’m referring to Amalgam ’02, which was in the planning stages
prior to September 11th, 2001, Sir. Is that correct?
Col. Alan Scott
That was after I retired and I was not involved in ’02.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
Will you accept that the exercise involved a simultaneous hijacking scenario?
Col. Alan Scott
I was not involved in ’02.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Sir, I do have some information on ’02, if you would allow me to read
it for the record?
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
Please.
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
Amalgam Virgo, in general, ’02, was an exercise created to focus on
peacetime and contingency NORAD missions. One of the peacetime scenarios
that is and has been a NORAD mission for years is support to other government
departments. Within this mission falls hijackings. Creativity of the designer
aside, prior to 9/11, hijack motivations were based on political objectives,
ie: asylum or release of captured prisoners or political figures. Threats
of killing hostages or crashing were left to the scriptwriters to invoke
creativity and broaden the required response for players.
Richard Ben-Veniste,
Commissioner
Well, isn’t that a bit fatuous given the specific information that
I’ve given you? It wasn’t in the minds of scriptwriters when the
Algerians had actually hijacked a plane which they were attempting to fly
into the Eiffel Tower and all the other scenarios which I’ve mentioned
to you. I don’t mean to argue with you but my question is, Sir, given
the awareness of the terrorists’ use of planes as weapons, how was
it that NORAD was still focusing outward in protecting the United States
against attacks from the Soviet Union or elsewhere and was not better prepared
to defend against the hijackings scenarios of a commercial jet, laden with
fuel, used as a weapon to target citizens of the United States? When you
say, our training, our mission was vestigial, I think you said it in capsulated
form but would you agree that on the basis of the information available,
that there could have been better preparedness by NORAD to meet this threat?
Maj. Gen. Craig McKinley
In retrospect, Sir, I think I would agree with your comment.
