| The end of the post-Cold War era M K Bhadrakumar On a day that China showed its firepower and set new frontiers for global razzmatazz, with about 80 world leaders watching and cheering, the opening ceremony of the Beijing Summer Olympic Games should have been Friday's lead news story. But events in the Caucasus dictated otherwise. The killing of thousands of people in the breakaway Georgian region of South Ossetia will turn out to be a landmark moment in post-Soviet Russia's relations with the West. Friday's Georgian attack on South Ossetia was intended as a provocation. The attack killed 13 Russian soldiers and injured 150 and took over 2,000 civilian lives, mostly Russian citizens. The South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali has been all but razed. Over 30,000 refugees have crossed the Russian border. The crisis in the Southern Caucasus has been slowly building since Kosovo, the breakaway province of Serbia, declared independence in February. By August, 45 countries have been persuaded by the United States to accord recognition to Kosovo, including major European powers France, Germany and Britain. Russia was expected to retaliate by fostering secessionism in Georgia and Moldova, but, contrary to expectations, Russia adopted a shrewd policy of garnering worldwide opinion against political separatism. Tactically, it suited Moscow that the Georgia harbored the hope that with Russian "goodwill", a settlement could be eventually worked out with its breakaway provinces. In other words, Moscow hoped to work on the diplomatic plane by getting Georgia to reciprocate the Russian "goodwill" and spirit of accommodation. Simply put, Moscow expected that as quid pro quo, Tbilisi would be sensitive to Russia's interests in the Caucasus. A significant body of opinion always existed within the Kremlin that Georgia was never quite irrevocably lost to the US following the "color revolution" of November 2003, and with patience and tact and a judicious play of the factors of history, culture and economic ties, Tbilisi could be made to appreciate that friendly relations with Moscow were in its long-term advantage. Indeed, a similar train of opinion also existed in Tbilisi - in a muter form, though - that Georgia's future cannot be on an a antagonistic path with regard to Russia and a course correction by the President Mikheil Saakashvili regime was in order. As an economic crisis and lawlessness grew in Georgia in the recent past, Russian diplomacy began shifting gear in Tbilisi, encouraging the elements that stood for better relations with Moscow. Up to a point, Moscow was right in doing so. But it failed to see that from Saakashvili's perspective, as his authoritarian regime became more and more unpopular and the debris of misgovernance, corruption and venality began to accumulate, it paid to whip up xenophobia. Russia was the best target, as nothing inflames Georgian passions better than the issue of the country's integrity. That is why Moscow protested when it began to be known that with encouragement from the United States, Tbilisi was embarking on a plan to dramatically increase its military budget 30 times. This Georgian move went side-by-side with growing US assistance in training the Georgian army. Moscow began asking a pertinent question as to who it was that Tbilisi visualized getting into a war with. Moscow proposed that an agreement could be signed committing all protagonists to commit to non-use of force in settling differences. But Tbilisi wouldn't have such an agreement. Nor would Washington prevail on Tbilisi to accept one. Not only that, Washington closed its eyes when clandestine supplies of weapons began pouring into Tbilisi. In July, the US Department of Defense funded a military exercise with Georgia. In retrospect, the turning point came when US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice visited Tbilisi last month. |
|
|
Copyright ©
Global Matrix Enterprises 2001-2008. All rights reserved.
Legal
Notice. |